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Crimes
Chapter 906: California's DNA Data Bank Joins the
Modern Trend of Expansion
Scott N. Cameron
Code Sections Affected
Penal Code §§ 296, 299.5, 299.6 (amended).
AB 673 (Migden); 2001 STAT. Ch. 906.
"We can't just be tough on crime, we must be smart on crime."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Department of Justice estimates that up to thirty thousand
rape and rape-murder cases where deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence exists
remain unsolved in California.' This DNA evidence contains "blueprints" of the
suspects who committed these horrible crimes.3 The DNA evidence from these
crimes is to be compared to California's DNA data bank' by July of 2003 with
the hope that these crimes will be solved.5 Yet, under existing law, only those
convicted of some of the most violent crimes are required to submit blood
samples to the DNA data bank for comparison.6 Chapter 906 expands the list of
1. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 673, at 3 (Apr. 3, 2001)
(quoting the author of the bill, Assemblymember Carole Migden).
2. See id. at 4 (discussing estimates provided by the California Department of Justice of unsolved rape
and rape-murder cases); see also CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CAL-DNA FACT SHEET 6 (2001)
[hereinafter CAL-DNA FACT SHEET] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (declaring that the
evidence from these unsolved crimes may have DNA evidence which can be tested against the DNA data bank
for crime solving).
3. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 101ST CONG., GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC USES OF
DNA TESTS 3 (July 1990) (describing the DNA double helix as a "blueprint for an organism" because the
pattern of "chemical subunits" defines the characteristics of an individual).
4. See infra Part II (elaborating on the features and processes of the California DNA data bank which
stores evidentiary samples of DNA).
5. See CAL-DNA FACT SHEET, supra note 2 at 6-7 (declaring that the thirty thousand unsolved rape and
rape-murder cases with DNA evidence are stored in "rape kits" in various evidence facilities in California and
that the Department of Justice expects these samples to be entered into the data bank by July 2003).
6. See 1998 Cal. Legis. Serve. ch. 696, sec. 2, at 3717 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 296) (requiring
DNA sampling from individuals convicted of certain sex offenses, murder, voluntary manslaughter, felony
spousal abuse, aggravated sexual assault of a child, certain felony offenses of assault and battery, kidnapping,
mayhem, or torture).
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felony convictions which result in the mandatory submission of a felon's blood
sample to the data bank.7
The expansion of DNA data bank legislation to include more felonies is part
of a modem crime-solving trend in the United States.' Advocates of Chapter 906
believe that expanding the scope of the DNA data bank will result in more
criminal convictions and provide a sense of "closure and justice" for victims and
their families.9 Several states already require mandatory blood sampling for the
offenses added by Chapter 906.0 Nonetheless, in California, Chapter 906 has
provoked Fourth Amendment and state constitutional challenges regarding
unreasonable searches and seizures and public policy concerns that the data bank
could become disproportionately populated with samples from people of color."
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1998, in order to aid public agencies in solving crimes, the Legislature
enacted Chapter 696 to create the "DNA and Forensic Identification Data
Bank."' 2 The California DNA data bank is managed by the California Department
of Justice (DOJ) at the DOJ's DNA laboratory in Berkeley.' 3 The data bank is a
computerized system that matches DNA evidence from crime scenes with DNA
"profiles." 4 These profiles are of convicted felons who were required by law to
provide DNA samples from blood and saliva. 5
Existing California law requires that "two specimens of blood, a saliva
sample, right thumbprints, and a full palm print impression of each hand" be
given by anyone convicted of certain sex offenses, murder, voluntary
manslaughter, felony spousal abuse, aggravated sexual assault of a child, certain
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 296 (amended by Chapter 906) (enumerating the newly added offenses of
first degree burglary, first degree robbery, specific types of arson, and carjacking to the list of crimes which
require DNA sampling upon conviction).
8. See Michelle Hibbert, DNA Data banks: Law Enforcement's Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 767, 773-79 (1999) (discussing the trend in various state legislatures of adopting DNA data
bank statutes).
9. See Letter from Nick Warner, Legislative Advocate, California State Sheriffs' Association, to Carole
Migden, Assemblymember [hereinafter Warner Letter] (Mar. 26, 2001) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (stating that "[t]he benefits of a beefed up DNA data base result in crimes being solved and in the
families of victims getting the closure and justice they deserve"); see also Tony Perry, California and the West
DNA Bank Helps Find Suspects in Rape Cases, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2001, at A3 (elaborating on specific
examples of how the California DNA data bank has solved crimes throughout the state).
10. See infra Part IV.A (expanding on the DNA data bank statutes of other states).
11. See infra Part IV.B-D (discussing legal and policy based challenges to the drawing of blood from
individuals convicted of crimes such as those enumerated in Chapter 906).
12. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 673, at 3 (Apr. 3, 2001).
13. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 295 (West 1999) (establishing that the California Department of Justice
shall be responsible for the "management and administration" of the California DNA data bank).
14. See CAL-DNA FACT SHEET, supra note 2, at 1 (describing the process of matching the sample
profile to evidence from a crime scene).
15. See id. at 1-2 (listing those offenses which require a sample to be provided in the DNA data bank).
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felony offenses of assault and battery, kidnapping, mayhem, or torture.16 While
each of the fifty states has enacted DNA data bank legislation," California's list
of crimes requiring DNA samples is more limited than the lists of several other
states."
The DNA specimens are analyzed by a process known as Short Tandem
Repeats (STR).' 9 This analysis only reveals the offender's identity and gender. 0
The analysis does not reveal other private information such as disease
predisposition, medical information, or other physical characteristics. 2 Only
medically trained personnel are permitted to extract blood samples from
offenders.22 The offender's thumbprint is placed directly on the sample tube of
blood to reduce the chance of error from switched specimens.23
Furthermore, the DOJ's DNA laboratory is linked to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) that allows states
to share DNA records. 2 The FBI created the CODIS system in response to the
DNA Act of 1994.25 The DOJ's DNA laboratory must adhere to stringent security
standards or risk being disqualified from participating in CODIS. 6  The
laboratory is periodically audited to ensure compliance with CODIS
requirements .
16. 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 696, sec. 2, at 3717 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 296); see also
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1332, at 2 (Apr. 15, 1997)
(elaborating on the author's statement that AB 1332 will help apprehend and convict criminals as well as
"exonerat[e] the innocent").
17. See, e.g., infra note 48 (providing citations to various state DNA data bank statutes); see also Aaron
P. Stevens, Arresting Crime: Expanding the Scope of the DNA Databases in America, 79 TEX. L. REV. 921, 922
n.12 (2001) (enumerating DNA data bank statutes for all fifty states); see also Warren R. Webster, DNA
Database Statutes & Privacy in the Information Age, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 127 n.44 (2000) (providing
citations to the DNA data bank statutes in all fifty states).
18. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the states that have broader DNA legislation than California and the
greater number of cases solved in those states).
19. See CAL-DNA FACT SHEET, supra note 2, at 4 (comparing the STR analysis process, conducted in
California since 1998, to the older Restriction Fragment Polymorphism (RFLP) process and explaining that
STR sampling requires less DNA and can therefore be performed on older evidence).
20. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 295.1 (West 1999) (providing that the DOJ shall use the DNA data bank
"only for identification purposes").
21. See CAL-DNA FACT SHEET, supra note 2, at 4 (explaining that the DNA laboratory in Berkeley
does not have the required chemicals or software to conduct non-forensic DNA testing and that the laboratory is
limited by "state and national standards" as to the types of tests that can be conducted).
22. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 298(b)(2) (West 1999 & Supp. 2001) (mandating that only healthcare
professionals who are trained and certified to draw blood may obtain the offender's DNA sample).
23. See CAL-DNA FACT SHEET, supra note 2, at 2 (remarking on the 1994 policy of placing the
offender's thumbprint directly on the sample blood tube).
24. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 295(d) (West 1999) (requiring the DOJ to utilize the DNA data bank in
conjunction with CODIS).
25. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001) (authorizing the FBI to create an index of DNA
records and DNA analyses).
26. See CAL-DNA FACT SHEET, supra note 2, at 5 (remarking that the DNA "[li]aboratory must adhere
to standards for privacy, security, and quality control set forth by state and national governing bodies").
27. Id.
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III. CHAPTER 906
Chapter 906 expands existing California DNA data bank legislation 28 to
require compulsory blood and saliva samples from those persons convicted of
committing or attempting, or found not guilty by reason of insanity of first-
degree burglary, 29  first-degree robbery, °  specific types of arson,3  and
32
carjacking. The expansion of the DNA data bank to include these offenses
broadens the scope of the data bank to contain "virtually all persons convicted of
'violent' felonies. 33 There are approximately six thousand convictions per year
of the felonies added by Chapter 906.3  Supporters of Chapter 906 assert that the
inclusion of these additional records in the California DNA data bank will result
in more felony convictions.35
In addition to the above, Chapter 906 specifies that the Attorney General's
office, the prosecuting city attorney's office, probation officers, courts, and
administrative tribunals are to be included in the list of law enforcement agencies
that may request DNA information from the DNA data bank.36 Chapter 906 also
provides that any person who knowingly releases DNA information from the
DNA data bank, for purposes other than criminal identification or suspect
elimination, may be imprisoned for up to one year.37 Moreover, if the illegal use
is for financial gain, the offender will be fined." Lastly, Chapter 906 provides a
civil cause of action for the DNA donor in the event the DNA is used unlawfully
by a DOJ employee.3 9
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 296 (amended by Chapter 906).
29. See id. § 460(a) (West 1999) (declaring burglary of inhabited dwellings to be first-degree burglary).
30. See id. § 212.5(a)-(b) (West 1999) (proclaiming robbery of a transit operator, transit passenger,
inhabitant of a dwelling, or person at an automated teller machine, to be first-degree robbery).
31. See id. § 296 (amended by Chapter 906) (declaring that, among other felonies, a conviction of arson
violating subsections (a) or (b) of section 451 of the Penal Code requires the offender to submit DNA samples);
see also id. § 451(a)-(b) (West 1999) (defining arson which causes great bodily injury and arson of an inhabited
dwelling as felonies).
32. See id. § 215 (West 1999) (describing carjacking as the taking of an occupied vehicle by force).
33. See ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 673, at 4 (Apr. 3,
2001) (elaborating that the inclusion of these violent felonies in a DNA data bank is not uncommon in other
states); see also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (West 1999 & Supp. 2001) (defining "violent felony," for the
purpose of enhancing prison terms, by providing a list of enumerated felonies).
34. See Warner Letter, supra note 9 (reasoning that Chapter 906 "increases the universe of available
samples that can be used to match unsolved crimes with the perpetrators of that crime").
35. See Letter from Pat McNamara, President, and Timothy H. B. Yaryan, Legislative Counsel and
Advocate, Riverside Sheriffs' Association, to Carole Migden, Assemblymember (May 10, 2001) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the benefits of the expansion of the DNA data bank to include
"apprehending perpetrators").
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 299.5 (amended by Chapter 906).
37. Id.
38. See id. (declaring that any person convicted of an unauthorized use of DNA from the data bank, who
does so for financial gain, will, in addition to the jail time, be subject to a fine equal to "three times that of any
financial gain received or ten thousand dollars, whichever is greater").
39. See id. (adding that if a DOJ employee is responsible for the unlawful use of DNA from the data
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IV. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 906
Expanding the scope of DNA data banks has become a modem trend in the
United States.n° Beginning in 1989, Virginia was the first state to enact legislation
requiring those convicted of certain felonies to submit blood samples n.4 Now,
several states, including Virginia, have expanded the scope of their DNA data
bank legislation to include many, if not all felonies.42 With Chapter 906,
California now joins this modem trend.43 However, because these convicted
felons are required to provide a blood sample without a warrant or suspicion of a
specific crime, Fourth Amendment, California state constitutional, and public
policy concerns are being raised."
A. Joining the Modern Trend of Expanding the DNA Data Bank
Each of the fifty states currently has legislation enabling the collection of
DNA samples from certain convicted felons.45 At a minimum, all states collect
compulsory DNA samples from sex offenders.46 However, California is not the
first state to expand its DNA data bank to include violent felonies.4 7 Rather,
twenty-seven other states already require DNA samples from individuals
convicted of robbery,4 8 and twenty-four states require samples from individuals
bank, the DOJ will be liable to the donor for five thousand dollars for each violation, not to exceed fifty
thousand dollars for multiple violations).
40. See infra Part IV.A nn.48-50 (providing examples of various states' statutes that have enlarged the
list of felonies that result in a compulsory blood sample being submitted to a DNA data bank).
41. See Hibbert, supra note 8, pp. 774-75 (discussing the evolution of Virginia's DNA data bank
legislation).
42. See infra Part IV.A note 50 (enumerating the states which have expanded their DNA data bank
statutes to all felonies).
43. See supra Part IlI (explaining the expansion of California's current DNA data bank legislation).
44. See infra Part IV.B-D (discussing the various arguments in opposition to Chapter 906, particularly
those offered by the ACLU).
45. See Stevens, supra note 17, at 922 n.12 (enumerating DNA data bank statutes for all fifty states).
46. See OFFICE OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL, DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF EXPANSION OF DNA DATA
BANK, attachment 3 (Jan. 2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (showing graphically that all
fifty states require DNA sampling for sex offenses, including California, before and after the enactment of
Chapter 906).
47. See Hibbert, supra note 8, 775-779 (discussing the expanding scope of DNA data banks in several
states).
48. ALA. CODE § 36-18-25 (Supp. 2000); ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035 (Michie Supp. 1995); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-4438 (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1109 (Michie 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-2-
201 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-60 (Harrison 1995 & Supp.
2000); IDAHO CODE § 19-5506 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2001); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4-3 (West 1997
& Supp. 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-1-9-10 (West Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1574 (West
Supp. 2000); MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, § 12A (1998 & Supp. 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22E, § 3
(West Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.117 (West Supp. 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-6-103 (2001);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-16-3 (Michie Supp. 1997); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995 (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2001);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.4 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-2-620 (Law. Co-op. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23-5-14 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321 (1997 & Supp. 2000); VT. STAT. ANN.
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convicted of burglary.49 Moreover, seven states have legislation that requires
DNA samples from individuals convicted of any felony.0
For eleven years, Virginia has collected DNA samples from individuals
convicted of any felony.5' Since 1992, Virginia has solved 283 crimes with its
DNA data bank. 5 The sponsors of Chapter 906 note that approximately 158 of
these 283 crimes would not have been solved if Virginia restricted its DNA data
collection to the enumerated felonies in section 296 of the California Penal Code
before being amended by Chapter 906."3
Sponsors of Chapter 906 also note that between January 1, 2000 and
February 27, 2001, the California DNA data bank solved six crimes-all were
sexual assaults, three of which resulted in murder. 4 Five of the six offenders had
prior convictions of robbery, burglary, or both.55 However, in order to collect
DNA samples from persons convicted of first-degree robbery, first-degree
burglary, arson, or carjacking, section 296 of the Penal Code needed the
tit. 20, § 1932 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.43.754
(West 1998 & Supp, 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-6 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 165.76 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-403 (Michie 1999).
49. ALA. CODE § 36-18-25 (Supp. 2000); ARIz. REV. STAT, ANN. § 13-4438 (West 2001); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 17-2-201 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.325 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-60 (1995 & Supp.
2000); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4-3 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-1-9-10 (West
Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 13.10 (West 2000 & Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1574 (West
Supp. 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22E, § 3 (West Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.117 (West
Supp. 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 176.0913 (Michie 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-16-3 (Michie Supp.
1997); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995 (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT § 137.076 (Supp.1996); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 23-2-620 (Law. Co-op. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5-14 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2000);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321 (1997 & Supp. 2000); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 411.148 (Vernon 1998 &
Supp. 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 20, § 1932 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie 2000); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 15-2B-6 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.76 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 7-19-403 (Michie 1999).
50. ALA. CODE § 36-18-25 (Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-60 (1995 & Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 29-16-3 (Michie Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-321 (1997 & Supp. 2000); VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-310.2 (Michie 2000); WIs. STAT. § 165.76 (1997 & Supp. 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN. §7-19-403 (Michie
1999).
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie 2000) (declaring that "[e]very person convicted of a felony on
or after July 1, 1990" must provide a DNA sample to the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services).
52. See Letter from Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, State of California, Office of Attorney General, to
Carole Migden, Assemblymember, 1 (Feb. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Lockyer Letter] (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (citing the number of crimes solved with Virginia's DNA data bank since 1992); see also
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 673, at 3 (Apr. 3, 2001) (providing
a supporting statement of Virginia's crime solving statistics using the Virginia DNA data bank).
53. See Lockyer Letter, supra note 52, at 1 (comparing the scope of the California DNA data bank with
that of Virginia); see also ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 673, at 3
(Apr. 3, 2001) (elaborating on the comparison between the scope of Virginia's DNA data bank to the scope of
California's data bank).
54. See Lockyer Letter, supra note 52, at 2 (describing the six "cold hits" made by the DNA data bank
between the dates specified).
55. See id. (analyzing the prior arrests of the offenders whose crimes where solved in the six "cold.hits"
made by the DNA data bank between the dates specified).
224
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additional language provided by Chapter 906.56
Like Virginia, the expanded California DNA data bank has the potential to
solve more crimes 7 Notwithstanding this benefit, opponents assert that the
extraction of blood from the persons convicted of the felonies added by Chapter
906 violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the
California State Constitution, while contravening public policy.
5 8
B. Fourth Amendment Issues
1. Protection Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons... against unreasonable searches and seizures."59 Typically, an
individual's assurance against an unreasonable search is the requirement of a
judicially granted warrant.6° A judge who approves a warrant, may only do so
upon a showing of probable cause.6' However, not all warrantless searches are
• • 62
unconstitutional. When determining if a particular warrantless search technique
or practice violates the Fourth Amendment, the court must balance the
intrusiveness of the search against the interests of the government.63
The drawing of blood from the human body is included in the meaning of
"search and seizure" in the Fourth Amendment. 64 In Schmerber v. California,65 a
drunk-driving suspect had his blood drawn while hospitalized after an auto
66
accident. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the search and seizure in
Schmerber because, ultimately, the search was not unreasonable.67
56. See People v. Sanchez, 52 Cal. App. 4th 997, 1002, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880, 883 (Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that the defendant could not be required to provide blood and saliva samples because the Legislature
had not specifically enumerated the defendant's offense in the enabling statute).
57. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (supporting the expansion of DNA data banks to secure
more felony convictions).
58. See infra Parts IV.B-D (explaining the challenges offered by the American Civil Liberties Union).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
60. See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948) (holding that, when police officers seize
goods, they must first obtain a search warrant "wherever reasonably practicable").
61. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause").
62. See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 12.01-19.06 (2d ed.
1998) (covering several exceptions to the warrant process).
63. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (applying the balancing test to hold that a police
officer's suspicionless stop of a motor vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment).
64. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (declaring that a "compulsory administration
of a blood test... plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment").
65. 384 U.S. 757.
66. Id. at 758.
67. Id. at 770-72.
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2. Does Chapter 906 Enact an Unreasonable Search and Seizure?
a. Lack of Individualized Suspicion
Courts have upheld DNA data bank statutes, even though the mandatory
blood sampling lacks individualized suspicion that the felon committed some
other particular crime. The Fourth Circuit in Jones v. Murray,68 in upholding the
69Virginia DNA data bank statute, stated that there is no "per se Fourth
Amendment requirement" of individualized suspicion when the purpose of the
search is for identifying prison inmates.0 The Ninth Circuit, in Rise v. Oregon,7
upheld the Oregon DNA data bank statute, stating that Oregon could conduct
such a search if it "is justified by law enforcement purposes."72 Also, the "special
needs doctrine," which allows a warrantless search in situations presenting
demands "beyond the normal need for law enforcement,, 73 is used in cases
without an individualized suspicion.74 The Second Circuit, in Roe v. Marcotte,"
utilized the "special needs doctrine" to uphold Connecticut's DNA legislation.76
In Roe, the court found that there was indeed a "special need" for blood-testing
sex offenders because of the high rate of recidivism for these crimes.77 Moreover,
the Roe court cited the usefulness and reliability of DNA evidence in its
reasoning."
However the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) points out that, unlike
the offenses listed in the Connecticut statute,79 the additional felonies added by
68. 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
69. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie 2000) (requiring a blood sample from persons convicted
of any felony).
70. Jones, 962 F.2d at 306.
71. 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995).
72. Id. at 1559.
73. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-75 (1987) (holding a warrantless search of a
probationer's home to be constitutional because the operation of a probation system presented "special needs
beyond normal law enforcement") (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)).
74. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-24 (1989) (holding that blood and
urine samples of certain railroad employees, without a warrant or individualized suspicion, did not violate their
Fourth Amendment rights because of "special needs beyond normal law enforcement").
75. 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999).
76. See id. at 79 (utilizing the special needs doctrine to uphold Connecticut's DNA data bank
legislation); see also Stevens, supra note 17 (quoting the decision in Roe as it relates to the special needs
doctrine); cf. Letter from Francisco Lobaco, Legislative Director, and Valerie Small Navarro, Legislative
Advocate, California Legislative Office, American Civil Liberties Union, to Carole Migden, Assemblymember,
4 (Mar. 26, 2001) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter ACLU Letter] (noting that the holding
in Roe is relevant "with respect to crimes for which there is a high rate of recidivism").
77. See Roe, 193 F.3d at 79 (noting that DNA data banks help prevent offenders from committing crimes
in the future).
78. See id. (elaborating that DNA evidence is useful in sex offense crimes because of the very nature of
the evidence).
79. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54 -102g (West Supp. 2001) (requiring felons convicted of sex
offenses and kidnapping to submit a DNA blood sample to the Connecticut DNA data bank).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
Chapter 906 do not have a high rate of recidivism and are only for "law
enforcement purposes."' As the ACLU notes, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
roadside checkpoint program to search for unlawful drugs was unconstitutional
because it did not go "beyond a general interest in crime control. 8' Moreover,
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the "special needs" exception as a justification
for reporting to law enforcement the presence of cocaine in urine tests of
pregnant women. 2 Consequently, the ACLU asserts that Chapter 906 could be
found unconstitutional because mandatory blood sampling does not extend
beyond "law enforcement purposes." 3
b. Reduced Expectations of Privacy
Courts have also made use of the reduced expectations of privacy for
imprisoned convicted felons in upholding DNA data bank statutes.84 The Rise
court noted that prison inmates who were required to submit blood samples under
the Oregon DNA data bank statute "lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in
the identifying information derived from the blood sampling., 85 Furthermore, the
Jones court found that a convicted felon had no right to privacy protections under
the Fourth Amendment. 86 The Jones court further applied this reasoning to assert
that Fourth Amendment cases involving prison inmates fall into a "special
category" in which there is no "per se requirement of probable cause."87
However, the ACLU notes that the Ninth Circuit, in Walker v. Sumner,88 held
that there is no "prison inmate exception" to the Fourth Amendment, unless the
search is related to a penological need such as prison safety.89 The Walker court
reversed and remanded a lower court's determination that a prison inmate's civil
rights were not violated when he was forced to submit to an AIDS blood test
80. See ACLU Letter, supra note 76, at 2-5 (comparing the decision in Rise to that of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)).
81. See id. at 2 (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)).
82. See id. at 3 (citing Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)).
83. See id. at 2 (noting the Rise court holding that DNA data banks are necessary "for law enforcement
purposes" appears to be in conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in Edmond that vehicle checkpoint
searches must go "beyond a general interest in crime control").
84. See Jones, 962 F.2d at 306 (upholding the Virginia DNA data bank legislation and noting the
reduced expectations of privacy for prison inmates). But see Hibbert, supra note 8, at 775 (discussing the
dissenting opinion within Jones which analogizes the search of a person's genome to a search of a persons
prison cell).
85. Id. at 1560 (upholding Chapter 669, Oregon Laws 1991); but see ACLU Letter, supra note 76
(distinguishing the Oregon statute upheld in Rise from Chapter 906 on the basis that Chapter 906 adds "offenses
to the California DNA testing statute for which there is neither evidence of a high rate of recidivism nor an
automatic likelihood of substantial personal contact between the victim and the perpetrator").
86. See Jones, 962 F.2d at 306 (elaborating that "probable cause had already supplied the basis for
bringing the person within the criminal justice system").
87. Id. at 307 n.2.
88. 917 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1990).
89. See ALCU Letter, supra note 76, at 4.
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because the defense had failed to show the penological need.90 The dissenting
opinion in Rise applied the holding of Walker to assert that DNA testing of prison
inmates should be held unconstitutional.9 '
C. State Constitutional Issues
In 2000, a California Court of Appeals, in People v. King,2 upheld blood-
sampling under the DNA data bank statute, section 296 of the Penal Code (prior
to amendment by Chapter 906), without reference to the California Constitution."
The King court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is
not violated because imprisonment results in lower expectations of privacy.94 The
King court stated that this lower expectation of privacy extended to a person's
identity as would be revealed by his DNA. 95
Nonetheless, the ACLU asserts that Chapter 906 may violate the California
Constitution.96  The ACLU notes that while the California Constitution's
provisions do not provide broader privacy protections than the Fourth
Amendment, 9 they do provide independent privacy protections.90 This assertion
is based on the California Supreme Court's analysis of employee drug-testing
under both the Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution.99 In Loder v.
City of Glendale, the California Supreme Court stated that the California
Constitution protected both autonomous privacy interests and informational
privacy interests.'O These state constitutional interests were used to hold that the
drug-testing of employees for promotions was unconstitutional.'° By analogy, the
ACLU asserts that the same reasoning may show that Chapter 906 violates these
90. See Walker, 917 F.2d at 386 (holding that not only must the defense identify a penological need, but
the defense must also show that the relationship of the search to the need).
91. See Rise, 59 F.3d at 1568 (Nelson, Circuit Judge, dissenting) (asserting the Oregon DNA data bank
statute should be held unconstitutional because there should not be a prison inmate exception to the Fourth
Amendment when the statutes only function is to aid in the solving of future crimes).
92. 82 Cal. App. 4th 1363, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220 (Ct. App. 2000).
93. See generally King, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 1363-79, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 220-30 (illustrating a case
where samples gathered during imprisonment were later used against a suspect after his release from prison).
94. See King, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 1378, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 230 (upholding the defendant's conviction
because the DNA evidence was not collected in violation of the Fourth Amendment). But see ACLU Letter,
supra note 76, at 2 n. 1 (explaining that the holding in King should be limited to the facts of that case, where the
defendant was convicted of sexual assault, rather than being read as automatically applying to other enumerated
felonies within the statute).
95. See King, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 1374, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 226-27 (analogizing blood sampling for DNA
evidence to finger-printing).
96. See ACLU Letter, supra note 76, at 6.
97. See id. (citing In re York, 892 P.2d 804, 813, 9 Cal. 4th 1133, 1149 (1995)).
98. See id. (citing Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1232, 14 Cal. 4th 846, 896 (1997)).
99. Loder, 927 P.2d at 1232, 14 Cal. 4th at 896.
100. Id.
101. See Loder, 927 P.2d at 1234-35, 14 Cal. 4th at 900 (holding that a particular drug testing program
was unconstitutional for existing employees but was constitutional for screening new job applicants).
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privacy interests because imprisoned felons have less freedom of choice to
participate in a DNA test than a promotional candidate has to participate in a
1021 .drug test. These state constitutional assertions' must not be overlooked as it is
the California Constitution, in conjunction' with the U.S. Constitution, that define
the privacy interests of Californians. 3
D. Public Policy Considerations
Supporters of Chapter 906 believe that it "makes good policy sense," as
Chapter 906 will ultimately result in crimes being solved and provide justice for
the families of victims.'° However, the ACLU raises Strong policy considerations
against allowing DNA sampling from those persons accused of the crimes added
by Chapter 906. '05 The ACLU believes that the enactment of Chapter 906 could
lead to future legislation requiring DNA sampling from all convicts and start a
"slippery slope that must be assiduously avoided." 6 Furthermore, the ACLU
contends that, because people of color have already been found to have been
inappropriately targeted by law enforcement, 7 the DNA data bank could become
disproportionately populated with profiles of people of color."'
102. See ACLU Letter, supra note 76, at 6 (comparing the privacy interests of job applicants "who may
freely drop their application if they do not want to be tested" to "prison inmates who have no choice under
[Chapter 906] but to be tested").
103. See NEIL C. MCCABE & CATHERINE G. BURNETT, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
1 (1994) (noting that a state constitution and the United States constitution cannot stand alone, but together they
provide the "total framework for government within the United States").
104. See Warner Letter, supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting the California State Sheriffs'
Association's support of Chapter 906 and its assertion that Chapter 906 "makes good policy sense").
105. See ACLU Letter, supra note 76 at 6-7 (discussing policy concerns such as privacy and Equal
Protection).
106. Id. at 7.
107. See id. at 7 (stating that "African-American and Latino civilians are targeted by law enforcement at
a significantly higher rate than whites" and citing the authority of United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d
1122, 1135 n.24 (9th Cir. 2000), as well as Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1182 (9th Cir. 1996)).
108. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Proponents of Chapter 906 assert that it will ultimately result in more crimes
being solved because of the larger pool of potential suspects contained in
California's DNA data bank.'09 This expansion is part of a growing trend in the
United States to include more categories of felons into DNA data banks."0
However, Fourth Amendment concerns remain unsettled, and the California
judiciary may have to balance the government's interest in obtaining the data
with the privacy interests of the persons convicted of felonies enumerated in
section 296 of the Penal Code."' Moreover, the ACLU's state constitutional
concerns and policy considerations present other potential future challenges."
2
109. See Letter from Pat McNamara, President, and Timothy H. B. Yaryan, Legislative Counsel and
Advocate, Riverside Sheriffs' Association, to Carole Migden, Assemblymember (May 10, 2001) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the benefits of the expansion of the DNA data bank to include
"apprehending perpetrators" and "reducing crime").
110. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the states that have DNA data bank legislation which is broader
than California's legislation).
111. See supra Part IV.B (analyzing the Fourth Amendment issues involved with mandatory blood
sampling from convicted felons).
112. See supra Parts IV.C-D (elaborating on the ACLU's position regarding Chapter 906 in the context
of the state constitution and policy considerations).
